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Among mainstream economists, there is a basic orthodoxy about the 
philosophical foundations of economic theory. They agree that 
idealizations about people's psychological preferences serve in some 
way to ground economic theory, that economic theory can be 
represented using mathematical functions, and that those functions can 
guide and be guided by empirical research into a large range of social 
phenomena. Theorists associated with the Austrian school reject this 
approach. They think that speaking of a person’s ‘preferences’ is just 
summarizing that person’s past observed behavior in a misleading way, 
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that formal rationality is empty, and that econometric analysis is of little 
empirical value.  
These differences have led Austrians and mainstream theorists to 
develop different bodies of theory, with different practical implications. 
But it is the philosophical disagreements between the two camps that 
explain why they currently have almost no productive engagement with 
each other, despite the Austrian school remaining one of the most 
institutionally established heterodox research programs. Neither side 
appears to have much interest in reconciliation, but, given the degree of 
overlap in both approach and ambition, this schism is due for a 
correction.  
The schism has been driven in part by the fact that the standard 
comparison between those in the mainstream and those in the Austrian 
school is too abstract to be meaningful. So, I will argue that a serious 
comparative evaluation of research paradigms requires a discussion cast 
at a lower level of abstraction. From this perspective, the problem can be 
more clearly seen to revolve around ‘extreme apriorism’. The 
disappearance of that idea, I argue, is a Pareto improvement for 
economics. 
 
II. PRELIMINARIES 
Before comparing the mainstream and Austrian paradigms, it is 
necessary to explain at least roughly what they are and how they differ. 
Some of the ways in which differences between these paradigms arise 
are visible to everyone. The two, for instance, differ in terms of their 
respective working practices. For mainstream theorists, economics is the 
enterprise of formal model-building. And sometimes, for the sake of 
simplicity or tractability, economists will need to include idealizations in 
their models. Robert Solow acknowledges as much: 
 
[I]f you ask a mainstream economist a question about almost any 
aspect of economic life, the response will be: suppose we model that 
situation and see what happens […]. The idea is to focus on one or 
two causal or conditioning factors, exclude everything else, and hope 
to understand how just these aspects of reality work and interact. 
There are thousands of examples; the point is that modern 
mainstream economics consists of little else but examples of this 
process (1997, 43). 
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Austrian theorists don’t view the discipline of economics in this way. 
They do not see it in terms of building formal models, and they are 
usually unwilling to accept idealizations or the implications 
underwritten by them. The more fundamental disagreements between 
the two camps result from two different understandings of the basic 
categories in play.  
One disagreement among mainstream and Austrian theorists, for 
instance, concerns the theory of preferences: what preferences are, how 
we can learn about them, and how we should theorize about them. 
Ludwig von Mises writes of preference rankings (referring to them as 
“scales of values”): 
 
[O]ne must not forget that the scale of values or wants manifests 
itself only in the reality of action. These scales have no independent 
existence apart from the actual behavior of individuals. The only 
source from which our knowledge concerning these scales is derived 
is the observation of a man's actions. Every action is always in 
perfect agreement with the scale of values or wants because these 
scales are nothing but an instrument for the interpretation of a 
man's acting (1998, 95). 
 
There are two claims in need of discussion here.1 One claim is that 
the only empirical source of information concerning people's 
preferences is their choice behavior. I will call this claim epistemological 
choice exclusivity, or ECE. The other suggests that theorizing about 
preferences should not make formal reference to anything other than 
choices. This claim I will call methodological choice exclusivity, or MCE.  
Resistance to these two ideas is not universal among mainstream 
economists. In fact, I believe that nearly everyone accepts ECE. However, 
a subset of mainstream theorists, revealed preference theorists, claims 
to also accept MCE. The ambition of the revealed preference approach is 
to justify the key theoretical insights of the mainstream approach 
                                         
1 Mises also makes a claim about the metaphysical status of preferences, in describing 
them as having no “independent existence” (1998, 95) apart from behavior, but I think 
this claim is better left aside here without deeper commentary. It is difficult to 
characterize the contemporary Austrian school’s metaphysical view as either realist or 
anti-realist. Mäki describes it as “a combination of ontic subjectivism and ontological 
objectivism” (1990, 336). He argues that “[i]t is ontic subjectivism in that many 
fundamental objects of economic theory are claimed to be subjective in nature” but 
“ontological objectivism or realism in the sense that those subjective entities are 
maintained to have an objective existence, they exist independently of economists’ 
theories of them” (336). 
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without reference or appeal to anything metaphysically exotic, such as a 
psychological disposition or mental state (Samuelson 1948). The 
revealed preference theorist’s characteristic objection to the mainstream 
approach is, in short, grounded in behaviorism. 
As I suggested at the beginning of the paper, the approach of the 
orthodox methodology is to take idealized preferences as primitive, and 
then to develop a theoretical framework from deductive reasoning about 
them. But, to whatever extent we have behaviorist sympathies, we may 
be unsettled by preferences as some sort of “primitive characteristic of 
the individual” (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green 1995). That assumption 
may amount to nothing more than a fancy way of begging the question 
against MCE. With this in mind, revealed preference theorists try to 
build the same basic framework from the other “direction”; they take 
idealized choice behavior as primitive, and then develop of model of 
rational preferences from deductive reasoning about that choice 
behavior. 
There is a well-known criticism of the revealed preference approach, 
stemming from its commitment to MCE. As has been discussed by many 
(Camerer, Loewenstein, and Prelec 2005; Caplin and Schotter 2008; 
Hausman 2011), the correspondence between a person's preferences and 
her choices appears to fail in contexts in which she has false beliefs. 
Daniel Hausman (2011, 27-28) offers the following example, drawn from 
Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet: since Romeo's alternatives were either 
to die or to elope with Juliet, and since the choice expressed by his 
behavior was to die, it appears as if revealed preference theorists are 
committed to the claim that Romeo preferred to die rather than elope 
with Juliet. But, on the intuitive interpretation of preference, Romeo had 
no such preference. Shakespeare intends the viewer of the play to 
understand that Romeo took his own life because he believed falsely 
that Juliet had died, and so, was unaware that eloping with her was a 
live option. 
As Hausman (2011, 28-29) points out, there is a natural reply to this 
problem. If we abandon the intuitive understanding we have of 
preference in favor of simply stipulating that people's preferences are 
exhaustively defined by their actual choices, the problem disappears. 
According to that interpretation of preference, it follows from Romeo's 
choice that he did have a preference, so understood, to die rather than 
to elope with Juliet. Problem solved.  
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This apparent solution loses track of why we are interested in 
preferences in the first place. As Hausman argues (2011, 29), if our 
interest in preferences were merely terminological, this kind of 
interpretative shift might be justified. But most theorists—and certainly 
revealed preference theorists—are interested in preferences only insofar 
as they believe that learning about them is instrumental in learning how 
to make reliable predictions about people's behavior. This ambition 
requires facing up to the methodological problems that ECE presents. If 
we cannot come to know what governs people’s behavior solely from 
information about their choices, then assimilating the concepts of 
preference and choice cannot carry us very far. To an extent, the dispute 
between the ‘orthodox’ and revealed preference methodologies just is a 
dispute about whether ECE entails MCE. 
Like all behaviorists, revealed preference theorists avoid explicitly 
realist commitments at all costs. However, I do not think they manage to 
actually abandon those commitments. Ken Binmore, for instance, writes: 
 
The theory of revealed preference therefore makes a virtue of 
assuming nothing whatever about the psychological causes of our 
choice behavior. […] [It] succeeds in accommodating the infinite 
variety of the human race within a single theory simply by denying 
itself the luxury of speculating about what is going on inside 
someone’s head. Instead, it pays attention only to what people do. It 
assumes that we already know what people choose in some 
situations, and uses this data to deduce what they will choose in 
other situations (2011, 8-9, emphasis in original). 
 
This description of the revealed preference methodology carries 
substantive commitments, at least by implication. According to Binmore, 
the revealed preference methodology relies on an inference from what 
people choose in some particular contexts to what they will choose in 
other contexts. But what could possibly justify an inference of this sort, 
if not an implicit auxiliary assumption about people's (relatively stable) 
psychological dispositions? As Binmore argues, revealed preference 
commitments do not “mean that economists believe that our choice 
behavior isn’t caused by what goes on in our heads” (8). His grievance 
with a realist interpretation of preferences is not that preferences 
actually lack such grounding. Rather, his grievance is that a 
methodology that helps itself to robust realism about whatever it wants, 
runs the risk of unsound practice. It is hard to disagree with that. 
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At bottom, revealed preference theorists don’t accept MCE, at least 
not in the strongest sense. They simply can’t. If people’s preferences 
don’t have any special metaphysical dependency on their choices, and if 
theorizing about people's preferences is limited to analysis of their 
actual choices, then theorizing about people’s preferences will be 
impossible (at least in many contexts of interest). We are left with what 
might be called predictive nihilism.  
Revealed preference theorists may think that the preceding 
discussion has presented a caricature of their view, for one reason or 
another. I hope this is not true, but my purpose here is not to enter the 
debate between orthodox and revealed preference theorists. I only want 
to point out a striking convergence in what Austrians and revealed 
preference theorists say. As Murray Rothbard—a student of Mises’s—
describes it, this convergence belies a more fundamental contrast to be 
drawn between them: 
 
‘Revealed preference’—preference revealed through choice—would 
have been an apt term for our concept. It has, however, been 
preempted by Samuelson for a seemingly similar but actually quite 
different concept of his own. The critical difference is this: 
Samuelson assumes the existence of an underlying preference scale 
that forms the basis of a man’s actions and that remains constant in 
the course of his actions over time. Samuelson then uses complex 
mathematical procedures in an attempt to “map” the individual’s 
preference scale on the basis of his numerous actions. The prime 
error here is the assumption that the preference scale remains 
constant over time. There is no reason whatever for making any such 
assumption. All we can say is that an action, at a specific point of 
time, reveals part of a man’s preference scale at that time. There is 
no warrant for assuming that it remains constant from one point of 
time to another (2011, 294, emphasis added). 
 
Here, we find the outline of a second sort of problem for revealed 
preference theorists (and mainstream theorists more generally). What 
Rothbard is denying is that there’s enough stability in a person's values 
over time to license understanding her choices in terms of some stable 
set of psychological dispositions. This objection can be traced back to 
Mises (1998, 103), but it continues to enjoy attention from 
contemporary Austrians (Block and Barnett 2012), and also hasn’t gone 
unnoticed by the mainstream (Grüne-Yanoff and Hansson 2009). 
To be sure, it is very difficult to determine people's ‘real’ 
preferences. In some cases, this difficulty arises because of the 
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instability of people’s preferences; what a person wants can change over 
time or across contexts. This is Rothbard’s complaint. In other cases, 
people’s preferences are difficult to assess because their factual 
ignorance opens a chasm between what they want and what they 
choose. This is the moral of the Romeo and Juliet case. There is a third 
sort of theoretical problem, also involving a chasm between people’s 
dispositions and their behavior. This problem, however, results from 
people’s irrationality rather than their ignorance.  
Austrians take the concerns about stability and ignorance so 
seriously that their theory of preferences is structured around them. In 
contrast, Austrians seem to regard the irrationality problem as a 
pseudo-problem. Human action can’t be irrational. Of rationality, Mises 
writes: 
 
Human action is necessarily rational. […] When applied to the 
ultimate ends of action, the terms rational and irrational are 
inappropriate and meaningless. The ultimate end of action is always 
the satisfaction of some desires of the acting man. Since nobody is 
in a position to substitute his own value judgments for those of the 
acting individual, it is vain to pass judgment on other people's aims 
and volitions. […] When applied to the means chosen for the 
attainment of ends, the terms rational and irrational imply a 
judgment about the expediency and adequacy of the procedure 
employed. The critic approves or disapproves of the method from 
the point of view of whether or not it is best suited to attain the end 
in question. It is a fact that human reason is not infallible and that 
man very often errs in selecting and applying means. An action 
unsuited to the end sought falls short of expectation. It is contrary 
to purpose, but it is rational, i.e. the outcome of a reasonable—
although faulty—deliberation and an attempt—although an 
ineffectual attempt—to attain a definite goal (1998, 19-20).  
 
This way of understanding rationality is actually quite friendly to the 
mainstream research program. Mainstream theorists, like Austrians, aim 
for ‘thin’ theories of rationality, ones that cast the content of 
preferences as beyond the evaluative reach of economics. Most espouse 
value subjectivism at least to some extent, because they appear to 
respect a certain kind of neutrality.  
It seems plausible at first to say that, since an act simply is 
intentional, purposeful behavior, there cannot be action without 
rationality. But this theory of rationality is so thin that it is practically 
invisible. It cannot explain why, by all appearances, some intentional 
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and purposeful actions are much more intentional and purposeful than 
others, while other actions appear to have been done without much 
intention or purpose at all. Mises considers these implications: 
 
The assertion that there is irrational action is always rooted in an 
evaluation of a scale of values different from our own. Whoever says 
that irrationality plays a role in human action is merely saying that 
his fellow men behave in a way that he does not consider correct […] 
When the expressions ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ are applied to the 
means employed for the attainment of an end, such a usage has 
significance only from the standpoint of a definite technology. 
However, the use of means other than those prescribed as ‘rational’ 
by this technology can be accounted for in only two possible ways: 
either the ‘rational’ means were not known to the actor, or he did 
not employ them because he wished to attain still other ends—
perhaps very foolish ones from the point of view of the observer 
(2010, 35). 
 
In other words, there is only one way an agent may genuinely err in 
“selecting and applying means” (1998, 20): if the agent does her best but 
is incompetent. One can, in other words, commit a ‘competence’ error. 
As Mises points out, we are not generally inclined to describe such 
errors as failures of rationality. But the reason the objection seems to 
arise at all is that everyone knows the feeling of making a ‘performance’ 
error—a one-off error against a backdrop of general competence—and 
these errors are the canonical failures of rationality. For Austrians, this 
is never how we are to think about the world. So, rationality requires not 
just subjectivism about a person's ends, but subjectivism about her 
means as well.  
Roderick Long motivates this ultrathin theory of rationality against 
the problem of intuitively irrational preferences, writing:  
 
What [those who appear to have irrational preferences] are doing 
seems crazy only because we assume their preferences are like ours, 
and that their beliefs about how to satisfy those preferences are also 
like ours. But the very fact that they are behaving so oddly should 
give us reason to doubt those assumptions. Of course they might 
assure us verbally, ‘Yes, yes, our beliefs and preferences are just like 
yours’. But talk is cheap. They might be lying, or confused. For that 
matter, they might not even be speaking our language. After all, the 
best evidence we have that their word ‘money’ means the same thing 
as our word ‘money’ is what they do with what they call money. 
Meaning cannot be separated from use. Something is money only if 
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it plays the role in people’s actions that constitutes its status as 
money (2004, 354-355). 
 
This passage may appear to be just an affirmation of Mises’s claim that 
assessments of irrationality always bottom out in differences of value, 
but Long’s claim is stronger than that. Consider a person with an 
intransitive set of preferences. How do Austrians escape trouble with 
respect to their evaluation of that person’s behavior? At first glance, 
they do this by denying that we could know the person’s preferences are 
wrongheaded by her lights. After all, she can adopt whatever ends she 
likes, and it is no criticism of her ability to act purposefully that those 
ends are wrongheaded by our lights, even if they leave her bankrupt. 
Perhaps she sincerely desires to be Dutch-booked, or her tastes change 
quickly. One never knows for sure. 
But the Austrian theory of rationality reaches further. Long also 
claims: 
 
[Those who appear to have irrational preferences] are not a 
counterexample to praxeological principles, even if we assume that 
their coins really are money.  And of course the latter assumption 
too may be questioned. […] [N]othing counts as buying or selling 
unless it is in accord with the laws of economics. Hence we are in no 
danger of encountering irrational prices, for the same reason that we 
are in no danger of encountering a chess game that consists of 
tossing a ball back and forth across a net. That wouldn’t be chess. 
Those wouldn’t be prices (2004, 353-355, emphasis in original). 
 
So the Austrian theory of rationality doesn’t just deny that the 
person is being irrational. It denies that the person is making an 
economic transaction at all. 
For Austrians, the theory of preference and the theory of rationality 
are not foundational. Both are implications of a broad skepticism about 
empirical social science (Mises 1998, 55-56), which is itself an 
implication of an anti-reductionist thesis about psychological 
phenomena called “methodological dualism”. In Mises’s words:  
 
Methodological dualism refrains from any proposition concerning 
essences and metaphysical constructs. It merely takes into account 
the fact that we do not know how external events—physical, 
chemical, and physiological—affect human thoughts, ideas, and 
judgments of value. This ignorance splits the realm of knowledge 
into two separate fields, the realm of external events, commonly 
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called nature, and the realm of human thought and action (2007, 1-
2).  
 
One of Rothbard’s criticisms of the revealed preference methodology 
is that it commits what he calls “the fallacy of psychologizing”, which he 
understands to be “the treatment of preference scales as if they existed 
as separate entities apart from real action” (2011, 296). From one 
perspective, this criticism is surprising: revealed preference theorists see 
their mission precisely as that of dodging metaphysical commitments, 
yet this is the accusation of the Austrians. But, as I argued earlier, the 
revealed preference approach ultimately inherits the metaphysics of the 
orthodox methodology.  
In contrast, Austrians are even more methodologically nihilistic 
about preferences than revealed preference theorists. There are disputes 
among Austrians about both how metaphysically loaded Mises 
understood methodological dualism to be, and about how loaded it is in 
its most plausible formulation.2 But in any case, it is what has led them 
to adopt a different theoretical framework (Wiśniewski 2014). This 
alternative framework is at once both wider and narrower in ambition. 
On paper, the framework has two aspects. One is praxeology, which 
relates to the deductive implications of the idea that people act, with 
intention and purpose; the other is thymology, the study of the causes 
that underlie the acts.  
The relative importance of the praxeology and thymology within the 
Austrian theoretical framework is the source of the most basic 
controversy within the Austrian school (Block 2012). On one side lies a 
sort of praxeological fundamentalism, which claims to uphold extreme 
apriorism (Rothbard 2011, 103-111) and which deemphasizes 
thymology. On the other end lie those who, although broadly 
sympathetic to the Austrian paradigm, favor a more thymologically-
informed research agenda. The motivation for this sort of moderatism is 
the hope that the use of empirical data can somehow be reconciled with 
the rest of the Misesian theory (Lavoie and Storr 2011). Some Austrians 
regard the disagreement as internal to the Austrian school; others 
regard it as the essential difference between two fundamentally 
different schools of thought (Boettke 2012, xii).  
                                         
2What underlies Mises’s dualism is not settled among Austrians.  See Kirzner (1982), 
Lewis (2010) and Hauwe (2011). 
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Nothing substantive turns on who ‘counts’ as what, but the schism 
has been the source of confusion. Without some measure of agreement 
about what the essential commitments of the Austrian school are, it is 
meaningless to have a critical discussion about what ‘the Austrian 
school’ has the conceptual resources to defend. The Austrian school is 
its essential commitments. So, productive engagement with it requires 
simultaneously exploring both positions in the context of a single 
argument. If we understand the Austrian school as methodologically 
defined by extreme apriorism, then the resultant theoretical framework 
will wind up being obviously inadequate for the purposes of serving as a 
free-standing research paradigm. So, we should understand the Austrian 
school as more open to moderatism. This turns out to have other 
benefits: it is more consistent with some of the most important 
contemporary ideas produced by the Austrian school, and also more 
consistent with the mainstream research program. 
 
II. THE INADEQUACY OF EXTREME APRIORISM 
Rothbard offers a characterization of extreme apriorism that 
emphasizes its connection to praxeology. Extreme apriorists hold 
characteristically that: 
 
(a) the fundamental axioms and premises of economics are 
absolutely true; (b) that the theorems and conclusions deduced by 
the laws of logic from these postulates are therefore absolutely true; 
(c) that there is consequently no need for empirical ‘testing’, either 
of the premises or the conclusions; and (d) that the deduced 
theorems could not be tested even if it were desirable (2011, 103-
104). 
 
At bottom, the disagreement between extreme apriorists and 
everyone else lies in their differing interpretations of the explanatory 
burden. Extreme apriorists claim that their critics are trying in vain to 
accomplish the impossible, while their critics argue that extreme 
apriorists cannot accomplish enough. So, while mainstream economists 
aspire for economic theory to apply to all interactions, even at the cost 
of making false assumptions about some of the features of those 
interactions, extreme apriorists are willing to accept praxeology’s 
incompleteness in exchange for its deductive soundness. It is on 
account of this soundness that they often describe praxeology as the 
more “realistic” approach to evaluating economic interactions (Mises 
1998, 34). 
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But extreme apriorists don’t get this soundness for free. The 
restrictions they place on the domain of discourse impose a high 
explanatory cost. By itself, praxeology lacks the resources to explain, 
predict, or even characterize many interactions of interest. To bring this 
out, I will examine two somewhat familiar games. First, one (Rubinstein 
and Salant 2008, 19; Hausman 2011, 29-31) which admits of 
representation within the standard formalisms of game theory: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Recess 
 
Recess: Timmy plays first, and has two choices, Face His Fear or Stay 
Inside. If he plays Stay Inside, he loses 1, Bully receives 1, and the game 
ends. If Timmy plays Face His Fear, Bully can respond either Back Down 
or Fight. If Bully plays Back Down, then Timmy receives 2 and Bully 
loses 2. If Bully plays Fight, Timmy loses 2 and Bully receives 2. 
The payoffs in this game are defined so that Timmy prefers the 
outcome of (Face His Fear, Back Down) to (Stay Inside) and the outcome 
of (Stay Inside) to (Face His Fear, Fight), and so that Bully prefers the 
outcome of (Face His Fear, Fight) to (Stay Inside), and the outcome of 
(Stay Inside) to (Face His Fear, Back Down). Under the standard 
interpretation, Bully never has a chance to play at all. This is highly 
intuitive: if Bully were to get the opportunity to play (i.e., if Timmy were 
to play Face His Fear), Bully would play Fight. Knowing this, Timmy 
always plays Stay Inside and the game ends immediately. 
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To examine this topic using the apparatus of game theory may 
appear question-begging, but the underlying insights don’t really 
depend on the formalisms. The formal game Recess is nothing more 
than an abstract way of representing a familiar set of collective social 
dynamics, and all the formalisms do is lend those implications a 
deductive flavor. The important thing to notice is that in order to even 
define the situation as one of a certain type, one must ascribe to Bully a 
preference between fighting and backing down, even though he’s never 
given the opportunity to reveal this preference. So how can that 
preference be understood?  
The orthodox methodology has a straightforward answer to this 
question. According to orthodox theorists, Bully has a real but 
unrevealed preference for fighting rather than backing down. Bully's 
preference ranking is just a formal representation of that preference. To 
explain these results, orthodox theorists need not to say anything 
evaluative about his dispositions. Naturally enough, revealed preference 
theorists have more trouble with the case. They cannot define Bully's 
preference in terms of his choice, because he doesn’t act. But they can 
ease their trouble by relaxing their commitment to MCE, a strategy that 
does not automatically involve their taking on metaphysical 
commitments any more substantive than those Binmore accepts when 
he connects our choice behavior to “what goes on in our heads” (2011, 
8). 
Extreme apriorists cannot give this response, because Bully's 
unrevealed dispositions are invisible to praxeology. They cannot give 
any account of Recess' important counterfactuals, and so, cannot 
examine how things may be expected to change if Bully were absent 
from school one day, or if Timmy were a little stronger. To extreme 
apriorists, this sort of counterfactual is categorically off-limits. In fact, 
they cannot define the game described above at all, let alone offer a 
nontrivial explanation of its outcome. There is only an inexplicable and 
unpredictable surface phenomenon: each day, Timmy decides not to go 
outside for recess.  
As far as extreme apriorists are concerned, there is no Bully. Perhaps 
Timmy is, as Long puts it, “lying, or confused” (2004, 354). If this is the 
only possibility from the perspective of extreme apriorism, we should 
hope those who actually monitor schoolchildren playing at recess aren’t 
extreme apriorists! 
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Games can also be used to draw out problems with the Austrian 
theory of rationality. Chess is a useful instrument for this particular 
task, because the errors that chess players make cannot be attributed to 
their factual ignorance—chess is a perfect information game. So, errors 
in chess must be understood in terms of the other sort of mistake, in 
terms of irrationality. Given our present technology, the game tree of 
chess is too large for exhaustive computational analysis. However, we 
can consider particular (relatively simple) chess positions, for which 
exhaustive game trees (called ‘endgame tablebases’) actually can be 
given.  
Consider the following position, one for which there exists a 
tablebase: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: White to play 
 
Suppose that White were to advance her only pawn forward one 
space (from the space whose coordinates are f3, to f4), or to slide her 
rook on e3 one space to the left, to d3. (The names of these moves are, 
respectively, ‘f4’ and ‘Rd3’). These are the moves that strongest human 
players would play, were they thinking as clearly as they could. 
However, both of these moves are actually suboptimal: White’s moving 
her king one square to the right (that is, playing ‘Kg2’) is the first move 
of a 99-move forced checkmate, and any other move leads to a forced 
draw. So, playing Kg2 is White’s best move irrespective of how Black 
responds; it is a strictly dominant strategy. Unfortunately, no heuristic 
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that could be interpreted and understood by human beings would 
recommend it.3 
Mainstream, idealized theories of rationality have trouble with this 
sort of case. They diagnose playing the suboptimal f4 or Rd3 as 
‘irrational’, which seems inappropriately stringent, given that knowing 
to play the optimal Kg2 requires near-omniscience about the 
implications of one’s play. But these idealized theories have the 
resources to offer some kind of indictment of the suboptimal moves 
(even if the indictment is too heavy-handed). Perhaps playing f4 or Rd3 
is forgivable, but there’s an important sense in which anyone who plays 
f4 or Rd3 in that position could have done better.  
Extreme apriorists, meanwhile, have the opposite problem. They 
cannot offer any indictments of those two moves (or indeed, of any 
moves). Against any move other than Kg2, they can only insist that that 
player was either incompetent, or abandoned perfect play in service of 
some other objective. But true incompetence is better exemplified by a 
move like ‘Rc3’, in which White slides her rook on e3 two spaces to the 
left, to c3. Here, the Rook is ready to be taken by Black’s queen without 
compensation. Anyone who plays this particular move is either 
incompetent or pretending to be. 
This case provides a nice illustration of Long’s paraphrase of Kant: 
“Praxeology without thymology is empty; thymology without praxeology 
is blind” (2004, 359). The theories of rationality that perform best with 
respect to this sort of case are theories of bounded rationality (Simon 
1957), which relax the requirements of rationality, for instance, by 
letting go of the requirement for logical omniscience. And indeed, in this 
case, a theory of boundedly rational chess play is able to offer the 
correct general diagnosis: playing Rc3 reflects incompetence, playing f4 
or Rd3 reflects rationality at the boundary of human capacity, and 
playing Kg2 (probably) reflects access to the tablebase. Austrians would 
recognize such a theory as employing a synthesis of praxeological and 
thymological theorizing. So, the idea of bounded rationality is clearly 
useful in this case, but it is also inconsistent with extreme apriorism. 
The bounded conception of rationality lends itself to much wider 
application than do the idealized (mainstream) or empty (extreme 
apriorist) conceptions of rationality. Consider a casino whose 
                                         
3 See Zarsky (2011) for an explanation of the distinction between ‘interpretable’ and 
‘non-interpretable’ algorithms. 
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management team wishes to structure their house rules in a profit-
maximizing way. Given these motives, which set of rules the casino 
should adopt depends on certain kinds of facts that are, by their nature, 
invisible to praxeology. If, for instance, the management team discovers 
empirically that their customers tend to play dominated strategies to a 
greater extent than normal when the stakes reach a particular amount 
or the clock strikes a particular hour, these facts can be incorporated 
into a model whose agents are boundedly rational in some particular 
way, which will in turn inform the design of a better rule set. Whatever 
the details, however, extreme apriorism is inadequate here. At least for 
their purposes, the team will want, need, and be able to fruitfully infer 
much more about the players' ends and means than praxeology alone 
warrants. 
Now, praxeology might seem inadequate in this sort of case only 
because the case implicitly contains substantive thymological features. 
Within this limited domain of action, it is safe for the casino to assume 
that most will adopt maximizing their winnings as an end, and will use 
this end to shape their choices of means to that end. But human action 
in general is much more teleologically open-ended. So, as those 
sympathetic to extreme apriorism may observe, no examples of the 
above sort (indeed, no examples at all) could falsify extreme apriorism.  
However, the examples do illustrate the general nature of the 
conflict between extreme apriorists and everyone else. In general, the 
greater the significance of empirical information and mathematical 
modeling in generating the results we want, the more limited in scope 
extreme apriorism appears by comparison. The best strategy for 
extreme apriorists, then, is to argue that empirical information and the 
predictive models borne out of that information have little to contribute 
in the contexts of greatest interest. And on the context of greatest 
interest—competitive markets—Mises argues: 
 
Within the frame of a market economy competition does not involve 
antagonism in the sense in which this term is applied to the hostile 
clash of incompatible interests. […] Competitors aim at excellence 
and preeminence in accomplishments within a system of mutual 
cooperation. The function of competition is to assign to every 
member of a social system that position in which he can best serve 
the whole of society and its members. It is a method of selecting the 
most able man for each performance. Where there is social 
cooperation, there some variety of selection must be applied. Only 
where the assignment of various individuals to various tasks is 
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effected by the dictator's decisions alone and the individuals 
concerned do not aid the dictator by endeavors to represent their 
own virtues and abilities in the most favorable light, is there no 
competition (1998, 116-117).  
 
On what basis would an extreme apriorist be entitled to make the 
kinds of claims Mises does about the nature of markets or of their 
participants? Without recourse to thymology, extreme apriorists aren’t 
entitled to make claims about the concepts of cooperation or 
competitiveness. Praxeology lacks the resources to even characterize 
those concepts so as to be able to distinguish between them, to say 
nothing of explaining their general functions in large-scale social 
settings. Extreme apriorists also aren’t entitled to claim that all 
participants ‘aim at excellence’ in any nontrivial way, because the 
Austrian theory of rationality prevents them from giving content to such 
judgments. Extreme apriorists are not entitled to make claims about the 
kinds of values, dispositions or attitudes actual participants have in 
actual markets. In short, they are committed to remaining silent about 
almost everything actual market participants do. Nothing about the 
nature of the aims of market participants or the nature of the large-scale 
social phenomena that emerge from the interaction of those aims 
follows from the axioms of praxeology. What extreme apriorism 
grounds is predictive nihilism. 
But when praxeology is supplemented by thymology, the prospects 
for the Austrian school research program improve considerably. 
Allowing for use of thymology opens up a large buffet of useful tools 
for Austrian theorists, the most significant of which is game theory 
itself. Game theorists now work on many topics that are traditionally of 
interest to Austrians, such as spontaneous order (Axelrod 1984), but for 
the most part, Austrians haven’t internalized game theory’s insights, on 
account of their supposed allegiance to extreme apriorism. Any loss of 
working efficiency on these grounds is unnecessary.  
Thymology also provides the resources to make sense of the chess 
position from fig. 2. Long explains: 
 
[I]f I am praxeologically mighty but thymologically weak, I might be 
able to write hefty tomes on, say, monetary theory, and yet be 
woefully unable to recognise monetary exchanges in real life—in 
which case I would be helpless in trying to explain historical events 
like depressions and hyperinflations. It may thus appear that 
praxeology is useless in explaining anything unless it is 
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supplemented by thymology, which in turn seems to require some 
special knack of intuition whose presence or absence seems more a 
matter of luck than of scientific insight. [But] we don’t count as 
possessing a concept unless we are—not perfectly reliable, but—
reasonably reliable at applying it. It follows that the just-imagined 
scenario of praxeological proficiency combined with thymological 
ineptitude is not a real possibility; we don’t count as possessing 
praxeological concepts except insofar as we are generally able to 
apply them accurately (2006, 42).  
 
So, praxeology by itself lacks the resources to even recognize figure 
2 as a chess position. One may, in other words, run across two persons 
seated across the table from each other, a chessboard with that position 
prepared, and praxeology is not only silent about what either person 
should do, it is silent about what the two are doing. It is only thymology 
that allow us to categorize this state of affairs as that of two people 
playing chess, and thus, only thymology that allows us to apply to that 
situation a theory of boundedly rational chess play. 
I don’t mean to suggest that all of the various challenges to the 
Austrian research program can be met by jettisoning a few incidental 
commitments, or by reinterpreting a few inopportune passages of 
Mises’s writing.4 To accept the explanatory benefits of empiricism is at 
the same time to accept its problems.  
How, for instance, does methodological dualism square with this 
newfound empirical optimism? If methodological dualism truly prevents 
using the methods of natural science to examine human action, how can 
thymology ever get off the ground? And what exactly are the standards 
of Long’s “reasonable reliability” (2006), either in the particular case of 
chess or in a systematically more general sense? And however we 
understand it, how could we ever know that we have it? And even if we 
set aside those ontological and epistemological questions, how in 
practice could we distinguish, say, a chess game from some other kind 
of structured activity that is played by chess players at a chessboard but 
with different payoffs? The introduction of thymological considerations 
isn’t in itself a panacea which lacks a need for further consideration. It 
immediately raises several standard philosophical issues. But this isn’t 
                                         
4 Scott Scheall (forthcoming) argues that the problems associated with extreme 
apriorism aren’t somehow undercut or explained away by the fact that the scope of 
praxeology within economic theory is narrow. 
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always an indication of a methodological misstep. And here, I think it 
helps reorient Austrians in a more productive direction. 
In fact, at a lofty enough level of abstraction, the practical difference 
between the moderate Austrian and mainstream research programs 
seems to run thin. Peter Boettke (2012) offers a set of three 
commitments he regards as characteristic of the contemporary Austrian 
school. This set includes (1) methodological individualism, the idea that 
social phenomena are explained in terms of how they result from the 
behavior of individuals; (2) the methodological priority of exchange over 
allocation, the idea that economics is primarily about “exchange 
behavior and the institutions within which exchanges take place” (xii) 
rather than mere allocative concerns; and (3) methodological dualism.  
Each of these three commitments has defenders inside the 
mainstream, at least outside the Austrian school. Methodological 
individualism, for instance, is an axiomatic assumption of non-
evolutionary game-theoretic analysis, and there has been consistent 
interest in the idea itself since Weber, including a renaissance brought 
about by Jon Elster (1982). The ‘institutional’ and ‘new institutional’ 
approaches to economic theory likewise suggest understanding the 
study of economics in terms of exchange rather than optimal allocation. 
Even methodological dualism, the least mainstream of the three 
commitments, continues to enjoy serious discussion (Chomsky and 
Smith 2000) as an idea. Overall, mainstream and Austrian theorists 
seem to share a similar broad ambition: to understand the nature and 
mechanics of intentional action, according to a methodology 
constructed from the subjective preferences of individuals. 
It is important not to undercut the importance differences between 
the two camps. Both, for instance, claim to accept value subjectivism, 
but the sort of subjectivism Austrians accept (Lachmann 1986) is often 
much more comprehensive in nature. But the broad point stands apart 
from these issues. As more and more Austrians conduct empirical 
work,5 and as more and more mainstream theorists work on topics that 
were traditionally of interest to Austrians,6 the value of methodological 
reconciliation between the two camps comes into view.  
                                         
5 See Stringham (2003), Chamlee-Wright and Storr (2010), and Selgin, Lastrapes, and 
White (2012).  
6 For work on subjectivism, coordination, institutions, and entrepreneurship, see Foss 
(1999). For work on complexity, see Rosser (2012), and for work on spontaneous order, 
see Leeson (2014).  
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So, one might wonder, who are the extreme apriorists? Was Mises? 
He’s not especially clear on this issue (1998, 858; 2010, 13-18), but I 
think the answer is no. He writes: “For lack of any better tool, we must 
take recourse to thymology if we want to anticipate other people's 
future attitudes and actions. Out of our general thymological experience 
[…] we try to form an opinion about their future conduct” (2007, 313).7 
Mises does not regard this sort of ‘opining’ as the practicing of 
economics proper. But insofar such opining as a superior substitute for 
what mainstream economists just call ‘economics’, this is a 
terminological quibble. 
I think that the idea of free-standing extreme apriorism is best 
understood as a relic of Mises’s hyperbolic way of speaking. Even 
Rothbard, the author of a paper entitled In defense of extreme apriorism, 
describes the basic assumptions of praxeology as “derived from the 
experience of reality and […] therefore in the broadest sense empirical” 
(2011, 65). And almost all contemporary Austrians have retreated even 
further. Boettke, for instance, writes: 
 
The epistemological issue Mises sought to address with his 
insistence on apriorism, while more exotic in its philosophic 
treatment than his predecessors, boils down to the claim that theory 
comes prior to observation. We use theory to make sense of the 
economic world around us. The choice for the analyst is never 
theory or no theory, but instead always theory that has been 
articulated and defended or theory that remains inarticulate and 
hidden from critical examination. The analyst does not confront the 
‘data’ pure and simple. […] [I]t is a mistake to believe that these 
arguments either claimed that the entire field of economics was a 
priori or that economics is completely insulated from criticism of an 
empirical nature (2012, 161). 
 
I think this passage is most charitably understood methodologically: 
as a way of distilling Mises’s project into a more palatable Popperian 
insight about the appropriate relationship between theory and data in 
the social sciences (Iorio 2015). It is not that there is no such thing as 
economic data, or that such data cannot make contact with economic 
theory in virtue of the kind of thing it is, as Mises himself sometimes 
suggests. Rather, economic theory should be regarded as prior to data, 
                                         
7 For more on this way of defending Mises, see Long (2004), Boettke and Leeson (2006), 
Long (2006), and Lavoie and Storr (2011). 
PHAM / MAINSTREAM ECONOMICS AND THE AUSTRIAN SCHOOL 
ERASMUS JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMICS 61 
and that this priority is worth understanding and taking seriously. I 
agree. 
I do not want to be misread as admitting to having been attacking a 
triviality. Even if extreme apriorism doesn’t endure in content—and so, 
no one is to blame for its persistence—it still endures in spirit. It should 
be eliminated. Once it is gone, the mainstream will be free to share its 
data with the Austrian school, and the Austrians will be free to share 
their theory in return. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
I think there are important lessons to be learned here, both for those 
broadly sympathetic to the Austrian agenda and for those not. 
As Solow noted, the interests of the Austrian school—to examine the 
nature and dynamics of human action—are far more comprehensive and 
metatheoretical than nearly all of what goes by ‘economics’ in 
mainstream circles. But why let methodological allegiances interfere 
with collaboration, ‘interdisciplinary’ or not? The Austrians are good at 
(and have always been good at) shedding light on what the economic 
mainstream could do better. Mainstream theorists would be well-served 
to develop a greater appreciation for coherent metatheory, the 
theoretical complexity of the topics of interest, and the limits of 
empiricism. And taking note of what the Austrians have done poorly—
for instance, embracing the synthetic a priori and their own heterodoxic 
status to a self-destructive extent—is also instructive. It offers a good 
explanation of why certain philosophical ideas are better left aside. 
For those with Austrian sympathies, the lesson is less cautionary. 
Austrian theorists should allow their theoretical frameworks to further 
cozy up to empiricism. It is time, in other words, for a ‘thymological 
turn’. Contemporary Austrians are increasingly receptive to this 
movement, and any further developments along those lines will serve to 
move economics even further toward reunification between Austrian 
theorists and their critics. In the end, the most important lesson for 
everyone is that, upon careful examination, the two camps have less to 
disagree about than either one thinks. 
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